We analyse the role of judicial intervention in helping to achieve the Argentine debt swap of 2005 with a super-majority of 76% of creditors (by value). The courts appear to have exploited creditor heterogeneity -between holdouts seeking capital gains and institutional investors wanting a settlement -to achieve a swap and to protect creditor rights. Our analysis shows how the courts have de facto carried out two of the key roles envisaged for the IMF's still-born Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) -namely Transition and Aggregation; and it suggests how the courts can, in future, complement the market-based alternative promoted by the US Treasury -i.e. collective action clauses (CAC'S) in sovereign bond contracts.
Non technical summary (and Post-script on current developments)
The Argentine swap and the debate on SDRM versus CACs.
In 2005, Argentina successfully restructured the majority of its defaulted foreign debt by means of a swap in which three quarters of the debt was converted into new bonds 1 . It has to be said that achieving the swap owed little to recent ideas for revising the international financial architecture; nor did it make use of contract provisions designed to promote bond restructuring. 
Judge-mediated debt restructuring
The New York Second District Court judge appears to have exploited creditor heterogeneity -between holdouts seeking capital gains and institutional investors wanting a settlement, in particular -first to achieve a swap and then to protect creditor rights. Our analysis of the opinions and orders of Judge Griesa's court suggests four distinct judicial functions. First comes the engagement of the debtor:
the Judge finds in favour of holdouts in order to encourage the debtor to make an offer. Second is promoting the swap: he refuses enforcement long enough to promote a successful debt swap. Third threatening attachment: once the swap has been accepted by a supermajority, it is time for the courts to threaten the debtor with enforcement (effectively denying it access to primary capital markets). Finally, direct mediation: at the same time as the judge threatens attachment, he is willing to resolve disagreements between some holdouts and the debtor to settle outstanding claims.
Currently, the last two phases prevail simultaneously.
Recent academic appraisal
For Porzecanski (2005,p.331 ) the case of Argentina suggests that "rogue debtors, rather than rogue creditors, are the ones that pose the greatest threat to the integrity and efficiency of the international financial architecture." Despite the waiving of sovereign immunity, he continues, "the fact remains that it is exceedingly difficult to collect from a sovereign deadbeat [and] the sad truth is that only other governments…can hope to rein in a wayward sovereign debtor and persuade it not to walk away from its lawful obligations."
By contrast, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005c, p. 10 ) commend the Argentine swap as "in most dimensions a textbook example of how to do an exchange". Their review of the evidence from recent litigation in international debt markets Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005b pp. 7,51) has led them to conclude first that "a good model of sovereign debt should assume that creditors cannot impose any sanction on defaulting countries" ; but second that creditors "can hinder access to international capital markets".
In their analysis of the regulatory reforms proposed for sovereign debt restructuring, Fisch and Gentile (2004) commend the judicial enforcement of sovereign obligations (through holdout litigation) over the uncertainty of market-driven, reputational sanctions.
Our conclusions
Examination of the Argentine debt swap of 2005 leads us to challenge Porzecanski's conclusion that the courts are irrelevant. Our analysis of judicial proceedings in this case leads us to conclude that, at least in the process of transition to CACs, holdout litigation may be key to preserving creditor rights in sovereign bond markets. The courts appear to play a key role and, for reasons of to do with aggregation, we expect this to continue even when CACs are in general use.
Update on current developments
In March of 2006, the Argentina government was able to issue new sovereign dollar denominated bonds which were taken up by New York bank. The bonds were issued in Buenos Aires not New York and were ranked as B-(well below investment grade); but they were placed at a yield of 8.36%, i.e. at a respectable spread of 3.7% over US Treasuries.
The New York banks are lending into a situation of serious arrears to those who did not join the swap --which appears to contradict the requirement of Kletzer and Wright's (2002,p.635) reputational model that 'lenders will not deal with the borrower until her obligation to the initial lender has been discharged." Is this a signal of a serious breakdown in the ranks of creditors? Is this a case where a rogue debtor is raising fresh money despite the efforts of the vultures and the judge to hinder access?
We believe the answer is no to both questions, for the following reasons. Firstly, the spread charged on the new issue is not that of a rogue debtor: it is broadly in line with currently performing sovereigns elsewhere. Secondly, Argentina is not raising fresh money; it is raising cash to repay principal due i.e. it needs this money to avoid default. Thirdly, the fact that this is being done outside New York (and well below investment grade) suggests that the Court's actions are effectively denying the sovereign full-fledged return to financial markets.
Introduction
In affected by a take-it-or-leave-it offer from the debtor, accepted by a supermajority of holders despite the substantial haircut involved.
To some observers, the case of Argentina suggests that "rogue debtors, rather than rogue creditors, are the ones that pose the greatest threat to the integrity and efficiency of the international financial architecture," Porzecanski (2005, p.331) . Despite the waiving of sovereign immunity, he continues, "the fact remains that it is exceedingly difficult to collect from a sovereign deadbeat [and] the sad truth is that only other governments…can hope to rein in a wayward sovereign debtor and persuade it not to walk away from its lawful obligations." Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005c, p. 10) evidently do not share this pessimism:
for them the Argentine swap was "in most dimensions a textbook example of how to do an exchange". It should be said that, in reviewing recent litigation in international debt markets, they find no evidence that sanctions on trade and payments have been imposed in an effective way. Why are they nevertheless relatively optimistic as to the 2 With bondholders taking a haircut of about two thirds in the process 3 These include vulture funds who buy distressed debt in default and sue for payment in full.
functioning of sovereign debt markets? Recent developments, they argue, provide support for the assumptions in the seminal paper by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) :
while "creditors cannot impose any sanction on defaulting countries, they can hinder its access to international capital markets", Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005b, pp.7,51) .
Examination of the Argentine debt swap of 2005 leads us to challenge both views.
Porzecanski concludes that the courts are irrelevant, but we note that the judge appears to have exploited creditor heterogeneity -between holdouts seeking capital gains and institutional investors wanting a settlement, in particular -first to achieve a swap and then to protect creditor rights. what light the Argentine case -and our interpretation of it -throws on the question of why sovereigns pay. Section 6 sets out how the widespread adoption of CAC's will reduce the role of vultures in future and sketches the role that courts and creditor committees will play. The last section concludes.
Key aspects of the Argentine debt -and some comparisons
Salient features of the Argentine swap are summarised in Table 1 compiled by Porzecanski (2005) . Four aspects are worth highlighting. 
a. Pronounced creditor heterogeneity
Argentine debt in default contained a significantly higher number of bond issues than all the other cases listed in the table: it involved many thousands of creditors in eight different legal jurisdictions. The sheer numbers posed a major obstacle to affecting a swap. Perhaps more significant however, were the conflicting incentives affecting different groups.
As Fisch and Gentile (2004, p. 26) 
c. Significant debt write-down
On a total outstanding principal of $81.8 billion, the Argentine swap involved a 66.3% 'haircut' (column 1). The only other haircuts shown are 40% for Ecuador and 37.5% for Russia. The 76% participation rate in the swap is by far the lowest shown and implies that Argentina is still in default with 24% of its creditors by value.
d. Long Delay
It took over three years for Argentina to restructure its debt -more than twice as long as it took Russia for example. In part the reasons were political as the interim administration of President Duhalde had no mandate to negotiate a swap. Economic reasons for delay are analysed in the next section.
The Argentine swap: a bargaining approach
It is clear from Table 1 that lenders to emerging markets maybe exposed to substantial losses --and to prolonged delay in restructuring in some cases. But the Argentine case challenged the idea that the IMF must play a central role in arranging sovereign debt swaps: stymied by conflict of interest and criticised by both debtor and creditors for its earlier handling of Argentina's affairs, the Fund had to withdraw to the sidelines and let creditors and the debtor sort things out themselves. "Argentina has become a test case for a vastly reduced role for the IMF and the official sector more broadly in the sovereign debt restructuring process", Roubini and Setser (2004a) .
In the absence of decisive third party intervention, Dhillon et al. (2006) apply a bargaining approach to explain both the final settlement and the delay in achieving it.
Because it predicts prompt settlement, the Rubinstein model of alternating offers, applied to sovereign debt negotiations by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) is not used.
Instead the authors follow the approach of Merlo and Wilson (1998) , where the size of the pie is uncertain and 'efficient delay' can occur as creditor and debtor wait for economic recovery (fearing that early settlement will lock in the recession). An alternative account for delay under President Kirchner is explored by Ghosal and Miller (2006) . It is noted that, where the debtor is aware of the constraints set by sustainability but the creditor is not, the debtor may have an incentive to make a low offer leading to delay to act as a signal to the creditor that sustainability is a serious cause for concern. While the Argentine government did not expect the creditors to accept their initial proposals at Dubai, the final settlement reached in 2005 was broadly in line with their sustainability guidelines; so, it is suggested, the delay may reflect a successful signalling strategy adopted by the President and his finance minister.
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Details of the final settlement (and how it compares with other cases) were provided in the previous section using calculations by Porzecanski (2005) He notes in his 4 Estimated to be 4% for both parties 5 Roberto Frankel, an economist who was a close observer of the swap, reckoned that the finance minister deserved a bronze statue in the Plaza de Mayo for his negotiating tactics! (Liascovich, 2005, p.257 ) introduction that "A sinking currency rendered the government instantly insolvent; the net government debt, which at the one peso per dollar exchange rate was equivalent to three times tax revenues and 50% of GDP, virtually tripled once the currency sank to around three pesos per dollar, becoming unaffordable to service." He also observes that policy prior to 2002 involved the authorities in "betting the ranch" by borrowing almost exclusively in dollars and other foreign currencies to finance a string of budgetary deficits, even though their revenues were due and collected only in pesos.
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Hence it is not the size of the write-down, nor the delay in achieving it, that could qualify Argentina as a rogue debtor. Ipse dixit.
Judge-mediated debt restructuring: from default to swap a. Historical precedents
In 1976, the US (and soon after the UK) imposed statutory constraints on absolute sovereign immunity from suit in foreign courts without consent Buchheit (1995). In the two decades that followed, creditors developed innovative litigation strategies to 
b. The court's role in the Argentine swap
The Argentine swap was successfully concluded against the backdrop of over 200 law suits -(including 15 class action suits) filed in New York, Italy and Germany. How was this achieved? We believe that in large part it was due to mediation by the judge and in Table 2 we set out a description of Judge Griesa's actions to promote restructuring. vacate the attachment orders) assure the creditors who may wish to participate in the swap that the court will ensure its successful conclusion.
c. Judge-mediated debt restructuring
Chart 1 provides a summary of the sequence of events described above -and where they may lead. As a preliminary we note that, in his decisions, Judge Griesa views the debt as a consolidated whole and continuously keeps the claims of the holdouts distinct from the ongoing swap. Ironically, judicial enforcement --with its lack of voluntariness--may free Argentina from its 'most favoured creditor' commitment to those in the swap 10 : the debtor can be seen to have had no choice but to accede to holdout (especially vulture) claims.
Of course, if the current impasse were to continue indefinitely with Argentina making no effort to compensate the retail investors outside the swap and running the gauntlet of the holdouts in all its international financial transactions, it would surely come to be treated as a rogue debtor and suffer whatever reputational sanctions that implies.
This is the second outcome indicated on the right hand side of Chart1.
Why sovereigns pay?
How does the analysis in this paper relate to the existing literature on the incentives for sovereigns to repay debt? What role have these incentives played in the Argentine case? The academic literature has stressed the role of 'direct' sanctions, 'reputational' sanctions, and of 'policy conditionality' rather than judicial interventions that effectively denies a debtor access to primary markets and provides the possibility of judge-mediated debt settlements. This is indicated in Table 3 . (9) Court as mediator (9) Threat of attachment pending
Willingness to resolve disagreements between holdouts and debtor
Market access
Reputation with leading banks "Anarchy"(10) "Cheat the cheater"
Not evident from sovereign spreads Notes to Table  1 . Esteves(2005) 2. Bulow and Rogoff(1989) 3. Dooley (2000) , Gai et al.(2004) , Irwin et al (2006) , Jeanne and Ranciere (2005) 4. Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2005) 5. Kohlscheen and O'Connell(2003) 6. E.M.LTD v. The Republic of Argentina (12 Sept 2003 ) 7. Sgard (2004 8. Kaletsky (1985) 9, Fisch and Gentile(2004), Miller and Thomas(this paper) 10. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) , Kletzer and Wright (2002) The use of direct military threats to enforce debt contracts may have been relevant in the nineteenth century when 'gunboat diplomacy' was common, but not now: WTO rules prohibit trade intervention for purposes of debt collection; and seizures not authorised by a court are, by definition, illegal. But as capital markets have become increasingly globalised, the waiving of sovereign immunity -often required as a precondition for issuing debt in London or New York -has allowed for the attachment of collateral assets under court procedures: and specialist vulture funds have developed litigation strategies to exploit these possibilities. In the case of Argentina, however, efforts by holdout creditors to attach assets have been a failure, as indicated in the last column of the Table. Another feature of modern capital markets is the ease with which creditors can exit; so sovereign debtors are exposed to creditor panic with associated financial and exchange rate crises, Ghosal and Miller (2002) . Reducing or avoiding the output losses that can be triggered by capital flight is now regarded as a strong incentive for sovereigns to honour their debts, as the references in note (2) to the Table make clear. 11 In the Argentine case severe output losses have of course occurred and -since default was widely anticipated -they ensued well before default occurred. Another sanction that has played a role in this case is the denial of trade credit, a device commonly used to put pressure on defaulting sovereigns, Kohlscheen and O'Connell (2003) .
Since the IMF policy of 'lending into arrears' initiated during the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s, the Fund has had to insist on explicit policy conditionality to avoid undermining debtors incentives to repay. Signing the Letter of Intent that embodies such conditions is a precondition for obtaining IMF programme assistance.
In the cases of Korea in 1997 and Brazil in 2002, indeed, prospective presidents were persuaded to endorse targets for fiscal prudence before elections took place, an illustration of the loss of sovereignty mentioned in the Table. Conditions for rolling over IMF lending to Argentina did include the requirement steps be taken to settle with holdout creditors: but by repaying all its IMF borrowing in 2006, Argentina -like Brazil -freed itself from any such policy conditionality. Kaletsky (1985) stresses the role of international pressure from G7, but this does not seem to have played a key role in this case.
We argue in this paper that the courts have in fact played a key role: by threatening the debtor with attachments to prompt a credible offer, then reining the holdouts in to promote the swap. After the successful swap, the threat of attachment has effectively denied the debtor access to primary capital markets, namely London and New York.
As indicated in the second line from the bottom of Table 3 , denial of access to these markets is one way of pressuring a defaulting debtor to settle pending claims against it. By undertaking to resolve disagreements between the debtor and holdouts, the court also provides a mechanism to ensure successful settlements.
An alternative incentive would be fear of losing reputation, with consequent widening of the bonds spread from normal junk-bond levels 12 to what might be described as rogue-debt levels. Despite Porzecanski's characterisation, this does not appear to be the case for Argentina -where spreads are close to those of Brazil. Kletzer and Wright (2000) analyse a self-enforcing mechanism -'cheat the cheater' -that could sustain equilibrium in debt markets with a limited number of banks 13 , see bottom line of Table 3 .
Their analysis, however, as in the original Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) paper, is explicitly related to bank lending. How, if at all, it might be extended to a world of anonymous bondholders is unclear.
Whatever pressure there is on Argentina to finalise the swap does not seem to be coming from self-enforcing market mechanisms which can operate in a state of institutional anarchy. The pressure comes from actions taken in the courts as part of an evolving process of judicial influence and intervention. Denying Argentina access to New York for the issue of new bonds may not impose immediate hardship on the country or its finances: but it is surely not credible that a middle income country like Argentina will wish forever to be excluded from the leading capital markets of the world.
CAC's, courts and creditor committees
The preceding analysis has emphasised the role that courts (prompted by holdout litigation) have played, and are still playing, in the orderly resolution of a major sovereign debt crisis. Study of the opinions and orders of Judge Griesa's court suggests three distinct judicial functions -encouraging the debtor to make an offer;
promoting a successful debt swap and finally dealing with holdouts -which together protect creditor rights. But the new bonds include CAC's, as is now common with new issues of sovereign debt. The future, it seems, belongs to CACs. How will this affect the role of holdouts and of the courts?
Promoting the swap and handling holdouts
Given that these clauses are designed to reduce the profit opportunities available to holdouts, it should make it easier for creditors to organise a swap, with a SMV requirement of 75% as the industry standard. As the IMF has warned, however, aggregation will remain a problem: the clauses only operate within a single bond issue, Krueger (2002) . The judge in the Argentine cases viewed the debt as a consolidated whole thereby effectively aggregating a majority of the creditors (76%) that participated in the swap. Despite the requirement for unanimity in the bond contracts, the courts promote a swap influenced by economic, political and financial factors at the time. Similar action may be called for in future.
With CAC's, however, the issue of recalcitrant holdouts should disappear. Subject to the necessary majority for a swap, the holdouts will be impelled to accept the same terms. They cannot hold out for better. While CAC's and courts may well solve aggregation and resolve the holdout problem, this will not necessarily prompt the debtor into making an offer. Vultures may not have the incentive to initiate debtor engagement but existing creditors will, as we explain in the next section. Esteves (2005) suggests that enhanced creditor organisation will substantially increase creditor payoffs. In the Argentine case, this would surely be true for those creditors who sold out to institutional investors at prices of less than 30 cents. But, because institutional investors acted to coordinate creditors and to negotiate with the debtor, the payoff to creditors as a whole would probably not have risen much --as the economic analysis of the swap in this paper confirms. If aggregation can be solved by CAC's and the courts, there will be less need for New York banks to buy distressed debt and bargain with the sovereign.
Debtor engagement: Class action suits and bondholder organisation
The To conclude, we see the vulture-initiated debt resolution strategies as important principally in the period of transition to CAC's. Unlike Fisch and Gentile (2004) , who emphasise the continuing role of the vultures, we assume that SMV (supermajority voting) under CAC's will actually minimise the threat of holdout litigation as we know it but nonetheless increase judicial intervention in debt restructuring.
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Thus instead of the threat of attachment by specialist creditors, it will hopefully be the formation of ex ante Creditor Committees, class actions suits and the possibility of judge-mediated resolution of disagreements between the debtor and holdouts that will prompt the debtor into making an offer to successfully restructure its debt, Eichengreen and Portes (1995) , Esteves (2005) .
Conclusions
Our interpretation of the Argentine litigation is that Judge Griesa has used creditor heterogeneity to promote the swap -encouraging holdouts to bring the debtor to the negotiating table but restraining them when they threaten the swap itself. Following this interpretation, we believe that the Judge will encourage the holdouts to threaten Argentina's access to primary credit markets unless and until it deals satisfactorily with creditors outside the swap. The latter made possible by his willingness to resolve disagreements that may arise between the holdouts and Argentina. If this happens, Argentina should regain access to these markets.
Our conclusions differ from those of Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005) who are inclined to dismiss the role of holdout litigation in favour of reputational models. Our interpretation can also be contrasted with the view that holdout litigation represents a lasting solution to sovereign debt crises, Fisch and Gentile (2004) : we agree that holdout litigation is 'part of the solution and not the problem' 17 but only in the period of transition. Our description of a judge-mediated debt restructuring emphasises the role of the common law judges in the orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises.
Clarification of the judicial role in the functioning of the sovereign debt crises should allow us to extend the analysis to examine the role of creditor committees in the context of the increased use of CAC's, whether this involves the re-creation of ex ante bondholder committees, Eichengreen and Portes (1995) 
